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Abstract
This study aimed to examine how family income and social distance influence young rural Chinese children’s
altruistic behavior in the dictator game (DG). A total of 469 four-year-old children from eight rural areas in China,
including many children left behind by parents who had migrated to urban areas for work, played the DG. Stickers
comprised the resource, while recipients in the game were assumed to be either their friends or strangers, with the
social distance (i.e., strangers compared to friends) as a between-subjects variable. Children donated significantly
more stickers to their friends than to strangers. Moreover, children from lower income families donated more stickers
than children from higher income families. However, no gender and parental migrant status differences in children’s
prosocial behaviors were evident in this sample. Findings of this study suggest that children’s altruistic behaviours to
peers are influenced by family characteristics since preschool age. The probable influence of local socialization
practices on development and the possible adaptive significance were discussed.
Citation: Chen Y, Zhu L, Chen Z (2013) Family Income Affects Children’s Altruistic Behavior in the Dictator Game. PLoS ONE 8(11): e80419. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0080419
Editor: Michel Botbol, University of Western Brittany, France
Received May 7, 2013; Accepted October 2, 2013; Published November 12, 2013
Copyright: © 2013 Chen et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by Chinese Academy of Sciences (KJZD-EW-L04 and Y1CX012Y01),the 973 program(2010CB8339004) and National
Science Foundation of China (30970911). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the
manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: zhulq@psych.ac.cn
Introduction
Altruistic behaviors directed toward non-kin individuals have
been rewarded across human cultures [1,2]. To explore the
essence of altruism, researchers have focused on children to
track their development in this area [3–5]. Recent studies have
found that even young preschoolers behave altruistically in
simple economic games, and their altruistic behavior increases
consistently from preschool years to early school age [3–5].
Relatively few studies have investigated the factors in social
context that influence young children’s altruism. Although
previous studies revealed that age is most likely a factor that
influences altruism (e.g., see[6,7]), examination of
developmental patterns is beyond the scope of the present
study. In this study, we addressed the issues of how
socioeconomic status (SES) (which refers to family income in
this study) and social distance (i.e., strangers compared to
friends) influence preschoolers’ altruistic behaviors in the
dictator game (DG), using a large sample of children from rural
China.
The DG has been widely used to assess children’s and
adults’ altruistic behavior in diverse cultures because of its
simplicity, uniform procedure [4] and tightly controlled situation
[8]. In a typical DG, the proposer (or dictator) is given an
amount of money or some valued resource and asked to divide
it between himself/herself and the recipient (or receiver). Both
the proposer and the recipient are anonymous to each other;
thus a rational proposer is assumed to be thoroughly pro-self
and expected to give zero. Yet in previous studies, players
from diverse cultures did donate a portion of the stake
consistently, with the amount of the donation influenced by
cultural and individual differences [8].
Though researchers have begun to address issues of how
genetic and environmental factors interact to shape children’s
prosocial behaviors [9], social contexts that shape children’s
altruistic behaviors remain largely unexplored. In a classic
study across 15 different cultures, Henrich and colleagues
suggested that the degree of market integration and the
payoffs of cooperation in everyday life would affect adults’
altruistic behavior to anonymous others, and that participants
from more traditional societies would be most willing to share
with others [1]. Other studies have addressed issues of cultural
influences on children’s prosocial behaviors. For example,
Rochat and Dias tested three- and five- year-olds in seven
cultures, including a group of middle SES preschoolers (N=41)
in urban Shanghai, China, distributing small numbers of
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desirable candies in 2009 [10]. All the Chinese children were
recruited from “a large communist party–run preschool” in
Shanghai, and the results showed that preschoolers in China
were quite prosocial in the game. However, China is a large
nation with a wide diversity. There are large and highly
urbanized regions (e.g., booming cities such as Shanghai), and
there are also vast rural areas in which many people are still
struggling with poverty. Children from socioeconomic status
(SES) environments thus may vary in their behavirors, as
Benenson and colleagues found, children aged nine from
higher socioeconomic status (SES) environments in England
behaved more altruistically than those from lower SES contexts
in the dictator game [4]. In Benenson’s study, a higher SES
school was defined as one where less than 5% of children
received free lunches; a lower SES school was one where
more than 50% of children received free lunches. Benenson’s
study was conducted in a western, developed country, yet, the
economical environment varies a lot in China, as an eastern,
developing country. For example, a specific phenomemon in
China is that a large group of rural children were left behind
when their parents migrated to cities to work. This practice has
attracted sociological and psychological researchers’ attention
since the last decade of the 20th century [11].
According to a national survey in 2008, about 140 million
farmers in rural China had migrated to cities to work and about
58 million children were left behind at their rural homes [12],
staying with extended family members. These children are
referred to as “left-behind children” [13]. Among all the left-
behind children in rural China, about 27% are of preschool age;
and most of them lived with their grandparents and/or one
parent since being left behind [12]. It has been demonstrated
that left-behind children of school age in rural China are
disadvantaged in health behavior and school engagement, and
children's psychosocial environment (including family SES and
peer support) is associated with their developmental outcomes
[13]. However, it is not clear whether children’s prosocial
behaviors would be influenced by their early experiences of
being left behind.
Apart from the challenges of being left behind and/or being in
poverty, many children in China have to face another special
situation, as many of them are only children without any
siblings due to China’s “one-child-per-family” policy , that has
been in effect since the late 1970s [14]. Some researchers
have been worried that only children might be spoilt by their
family members and become self-centred “little emperors” [15]
[16]. Other researchers have examined the social development
of school age children and found that being only child is not
associated with behavior problems [17]. It was further
demonstrated that Chinese adolescent only children
outperformed their counterparts who have siblings in terms of
many psycho-behavioural characteristics, for example, being
more involved in making donations to benevolent organizations
[18]. However, whether young preschool children’s prosocial
behaviors are influenced by their status of being only children
or not remains largely unexplored. Thus it is of particular
interest to investigate how the factors mentioned above could
possibly influence children’s altruistic behaviors in China, as
such a rapidly developing and changing society.
In addition to the SES and family structure variables, we are
also interested in how young children would behave when
playing DG with receivers of different social distance (i.e.,
strangers compared to friends). Previous studies have found
that college students would give more to friends (not knowing
which friend) than to a stranger in DG [19]. Also, dictators of
school age would behave more altruistic in DG as the social
distance between dictator and receiver decreases, they would
donate most money to their closest friends [20]. In the present
study, we examined whether social distance (i.e., strangers
and friends) between dictator and receiver would influence
younger children namely preschool children’s DG allocations.
We further investigated how SES and family structure could
possibly influence children’s allocations to receivers of different
social distance in DG.
To explore the factors that influence children’s altruistic
behavior, a large sample of four-year-old (3:6 to 4:6) children
were included in this study. This age range was chosen as
three- to four-year- olds enroll in preschool/kindergarten in
most areas of China. All participants in the current study were
recruited from local preschools/kindergartens, thus all children
have some, though not necessarily comparable, experience
interacting with both strangers and friends. The specific
variables of interest were: whether preschoolers in China would
exhibit altruistic behaviors differently towards friends and
strangers in DG, whether such behaviors would be shaped by
the social contexts in which they were raised [e.g., family
income, number of siblings, number of parents having
migrated]. To explore the influence of SES, we chose an
individual level variable, that is, average family income per year
per person, as reported by each child’s parent or caregiver.
We hypothesized that children of preschool age would
donate more to friends than to strangers in DG. Furthermore, in
the context of rural China, though quite different from the
context in England (see [4]), we hypothesized that children’s
altruistic behaviors in DG would be associated with their family
income, and left-behind children would be different to non-left-
behind children in their altruistic behaviors.
Method
Participants
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at
Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Written
informed consent was obtained from each participant’s parent
or main care-giver (when both parents of the child migrated for
work). Participants in the study consisted of 469 kindergarten
children (252 boys and 217 girls) in eight counties in rural
China. The sites were distributed evenly in four large areas in
China, including two in northern China (Qingyuan and Wuyi in
Hebei Province), two in central China (Jiangyong in Hunan
Province and Luanchuan in Henan Province), two in eastern
China (Yuexi and Huoqiu in Anhui Province), and two in
southwest China (Renshou and Jingyan in Sichuan Province).
The sample size from each site varied from 24 to 74 children,
due to sampling convenience. The broad sample is moderately
large as well as ethnically and economically diverse. More than
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88% of the children were of Han nationality, the major ethnic
group (over 90% of the population) in China.
Assessments were conducted when the children were four
years old, ranging in age from 3:6 to 4:6; all the children were
recruited from local kindergartens. Children’s parents or
primary caregivers reported sibling status and other
demographic variables in questionnaires: 63.9% of children’s
fathers were farmers. More than half (53.0%) of the children in
the sample were only children, while the remainder had one or
more than one sibling. 62.0% of participants had more than five
family members, usually including the child’s parents and
grandparents. In the present study, among all 251 migrant
families, father-only migration is most common (135 families,
54%), followed by two-parent migration (79 families, 31%) and
then mother-only migration (37 families, 15%). This pattern is
slightly different from that in Wen’s study [13], in which two-
parent migration was common. Presumably this was due to the
fact that children in the present study were substantially
younger than those in Wen’s study, and relatively few mothers
migrated to work when children were still at their preschool
age.
Procedure
The paradigm was a modified version of the classic dictator
game; there were no real receivers at the site. The scenario
was a story-like situation that children usually experience in
kindergartens. Social distance was a between-subject variable
with the levels of stranger and friend. Children in each site
were randomly assigned to either the stranger or friend
condition. All children participated in the dictator game only
once, as proposers.
Children were interviewed one by one in a quiet room. They
were told to play games, but were not told what games they
were going to play before they entered the meeting room. So
children in both conditions did not know what other children
have done before the dictator game began. At the time of
testing, they were separated from each other, and they did not
know what other children (the possible responders, i.e., friends
or strangers) were doing.
Each game was played with an endowment of four stickers.
Attractive stickers were used as resources. These stickers
were selected as they are highly valued by children of this age
in China. Kindergarten teachers usually use them to reward
children’s good manners. We adjusted the number of stickers
to four in DG to ensure that children’s performance would not
be affected by their numerical knowledge.
At the time of testing, each child was brought individually,
from their classroom, to a quiet room by an interviewer. The
child and the interviewer sat across from each other at a child-
sized table. The interviewer first introduced herself and asked
the child’s name. Then she informed the child that she had four
stickers for the child, and she laid them out on the table, in front
of the child. The interviewer then declared that the child would
play a game with a partner. The partner was explained
according to the condition in which the child participated.
In the friend condition, the interviewer would ask who the
child’s best friend was. Most children named a child to this
question, although a few children were not immediately sure. In
these cases, the interviewer would ask the child who he/she
often played with in the kindergarten. Once the child identified
the best friend, the interviewer displayed a set of four stickers
and declared that he/she would play a game with his/her best
friend.
Standard instruction for the friend condition was as follows:
“Would you please tell me who is your best friend in your
class? OK, now suppose you are going to play a distribution
game with him/her. Now here are four stickers, they are all
yours, you can distribute them between you and your friend.
Your friend can only agree with you and receive whatever
number you give to him/her (“Ta”, in Chinese); Ta cannot reject
your offer. You may distribute one, two, three, or all four
stickers to him/her, or you could give Ta nothing and keep
them all. So, would you like to give any of those to your friend?
How many of them would you like to give? You may give
him/her one, two, three, or all four stickers, or you could keep
all to yourself. It is up to you.” To make sure the child
understood the number donated, the interviewer would count
the stickers slowly when the child was watching. The stickers
were given to children afterwards.
In the stranger condition, the interviewer told the child that
he/she (“Ta”, in Chinese) would play the game with a peer that
Ta did not know (i.e., a stranger). The instruction for the
stranger condition would begin as follows: “Now you are going
to play a distribution game with a child at your age that you do
not know. And Ta (meaning he or she) would not know who
you are.” The procedure following this instruction was identical
to that in the friend condition.
Results
The results of the present study were analyzed using SPSS
16.0. The data are stored in the Institute Lab and are
accessible to researchers who are interested in it for academic
reasons. Please write to the corresponding author, and we are
happy to share the data.
One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were carried out to
examine the distribution pattern of children’s DG offers. The
results showed that children’s DG offers to friends (M = 1.64, N
= 225, p = .065) and to strangers (M = 1.37, N = 230, p = .229)
both followed Possion distributions (but not Normal
distributions). The results of the Mann-Whitney U test showed
significant differences between these two distributions (p = .
002). As Figure 1 demonstrates, more participants would give
nothing to strangers than to friends [strangers: 32.2%, N = 230;
friends: 10.7%, N = 225; Pearson χ2(1) = 31.13, p = .005], and
more participants chose equal distribution to friends than to
strangers [strangers: 24.8%, N = 230; friends: 38.7%, N = 225;
Pearson χ2(1) = 10.14, p = .005], though the contribution
patterns of both social level conditions were basically
distributed over the range [0, .5]. Moreover, 16.0% of the
children in friend condition, and 18.3% of the children in
stranger condition, gave more than half of the stickers to others
(the difference was not significant, Pearson χ2(1) = 0.10, p = .
750). This findings of children’s generosity are further
discussed in the Discussion section.
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As children in every sample site were randomly distributed to
stranger or friend conditions, all the independent variables in
Table 1 showed no significant differences between the two
social distance levels. So the two groups were comparable as
far as we mainly focused on the variables listed in Table 1.
Among all participants, 16.8% of them were left-behind as both
parents migrated, 28.7% were left-behind as only fathers
migrated, 7.9% were left-behind as only mothers migrated, and
24.7% were non-left-behind children.
In order to examine whether parental migrant status affects
family income and other variables, Kruskal-Wallis H tests were
carried out, and the p values were listed in Table 1. As shown
in Table 1, though left-behind children seem offer more stickers
than the non-left-behind, the difference was not significant (p
= .355). Family income did not differ significantly (p = .975)
between left-behind and non-left-behind children either. Except
children’s age (p = .017), all other variables listed in Table 1 did
not differ significantly by parental migrant status. In the
following part, we will further analyze how children’s age and
other variables are related.
The correlations of social distance, SES variables and DG
offers are shown in Table 2. In the whole sample, we found that
social distance (Spearman r = -.15, p = .002) and family
income (Spearman r = -.10, p = .037) were negatively related
to DG offers. Other demographic and SES variables were not
significantly related to DG offers. Overall, children donated
more stickers to friends than to strangers, and children from
lower income families donated more than children from higher
income families. Correlation analyses also showed that
parental migrant status was related with children’s age
(Spearman r = -.13, p = .015); when children were still at a
young age, it was more likely that only fathers migrated to work
and mothers stayed at home. Moreover, it should be noted that
parental migrant status was not related to family income
significantly (Spearman r = -.01, p = .848).
In the friend condition, both-parent migration was positively
related to DG offers (Spearman r = .20, p = .009), and family
income was negatively related to DG offers (Spearman r = -.19,
p = .005). It seems that children who were left behind by their
migrant parents donated more to their friends than other
children, and children from lower income families donated more
Figure 1.  Distribution of number of stickers donated in
DG, by social distance levels (between-subject), for the
complete sample.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080419.g001
to their friends than children from higher income families (see
Table 2). However, none of the explanatory variables listed in
Table 2 were significantly related to children’s DG offers to
strangers. In the following section, we further examined
possible interactions between social distance and other
variables.
From the correlation analyses (see Table 2), three potential
predictors (i.e., social distance, family income, and both-parent
migration) of DG offers were found. We further explored
whether there were any interactions among them, using
hierarchical regression analyses. The continuous predictors
were centered, represented as deviations from their own
(sample) means. As shown in Table 3, the three potential
predictors were entered in the first step. In the second step, the
two-way interactions (i.e., social distance * family income,
family income * both-parent migration, and social distance *
both-parent migration) were entered. In the third step, the
three-way interaction (i.e., social distance * family income *
both-parent migration) was entered. Beta coefficients (β ) and t
values (at entry as well as in the final equation) are reported for
each variable, and variance accounted for (R2) and change in
R2 are reported for each step in Table 3. For the whole sample,
no significant interaction term was found. Therefore, it seemed
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean±SD/percentage).
 
No-parent
migration
Mother-only
migration
Father-only
migration
Both-parent
migration p
Dependant
variable      
Children’s DG
offers 1.47 ± 1.19 1.36 ± 1.05 1.40 ± 1.04 1.69 ± 1.17 .355
DG offers to
friends 1.47 ±. 97 1.50 ± .86 1.51 ± .94 1.97 ± 1.01 .077
DG offers to
strangers 1.47 ± 1.35 1.22 ± 1.22 1.30 ± 1.14 1.39 ± 1.27 .938
Independent
variables      
Children’s Age
(years) 4.07 ± .31 4.02 ± .34 3.94 ± .29 3.98 ± .26 .017
Gender (male=1) .56 .49 .56 .53 .852
Number of
children in the
family
1.54 ± .61 1.35 ± .54 1.52 ± .61 1.51 ± .63 .381
Maternal
education (years) 9.35 ± 2.34 9.60 ± 2.46 9.38 ± 2.40 8.84 ± 1.53 .512
Paternal
education (years) 9.95 ± 2.30
10.31 ±
2.70 9.77 ± 2.57 9.29 ± 1.62 .208
Family income (in
1000 RMB) 5.00 ± .34 5.16 ± .40 6.12 ± .61 5.46 ± .51 .975
Social distance
(strangers=1) .56 .51 .50 .47 .611
Note. Children’s DG offers = Children’s DG offers in the whole sample (N = 455). N
= 225 for friend condition, N = 230 for stranger condition. Family income = Average
annual per capita family income, median. one hundred Yuan RMB = 14.95 US
dollars at the time of testing.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080419.t001
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that family income did not affect young children's giving to
friends and strangers, and parental migrant status did not
influence children’s prosocial behaviors in DG in this sample.
Since no interaction term was significant, we refitted the
model without the insignificant interactions so that other effects
might be better assessed. Hierarchical regression analyses
were used to examine the influence of social distance and
family income, and to determine how much variance they
accounted for. Beta coefficients (β ) and t values (at entry as
well as in the final equation) are reported for each variable, and
variance accounted for (R2) and change in R2 are reported for
each step (see Table 4).
The regression analyses showed that both predictors
significantly contributed to the DG offers. These results
revealed that children from lower-income families were more
altruistic than those from higher-income families (β = -.13, p = .
006), and children donated more to their friends than to
strangers (β = -.11, p =.023). Some of our hypotheses were
confirmed by the regression analyses, as it is evident that both
social distance and family income significantly contributed to
whole DG offers in preschool children. However, the
relationship between parental migrant status and children’s
prosocial behaviors was not significant. Moreover, it should be
noted that family income and social distance only explained a
small portion of variances. We will discuss this in the following
session.
Discussion
The current study contributes to our understanding of factors
impacting children’s altruistic behaviors, especially among rural
Chinese preschool children. First of all, the results of this study
show that children’s altruism decreased with increasing family
income. The results are consistent with studies with adults that
show that adversities increase people’s prosocial behaviors
[21,22]. However, the results differ from Benenson’s study [4]
conducted in England, which showed that SES does not affect
children’s altruism in DG until they reach nine years old, when
children’s mean DG offer increases with increasing SES levels.
Why does SES seem to exert different impacts on English
and Chinese children’s altruism? Children in Benenson’s study
[4] played DG with only strangers, and the results showed that
children’s altruisitic behaviors in DG were not influenced by
SES until children reached school age. In the present study,
consistent with Benenson’s (2007) study, preschoolers’
Table 3. Examination of Possible Interactions among Three
Independent Variables.
Step Predictors t p β R2 △R2 F change
Children’s DG offers       
1 Social distance -1.825 .069 -.098 .031 .031 3.581*
Family income -2.024 .044 -.109    
BPM 1.819 .070 .098    
2 Social distance -1.112 .267 -.067 .040 .009 1.028
Family income -2.217 .027 -.172    
BPM 2.137 .033 .161    
Social distance * Family income 1.280 .201 .091    
Family income * BPM .066 .947 .004    
Social distance * BPM -1.151 .250 -.092    
3 Social distance -1.111 .267 -.067 .040 .000 .007
Family income -2.137 .033 -.174    
BPM 2.129 .034 .161    
Social distance * Family income 1.180 .239 .094    
Family income * BPM .102 .919 .008    
Social distance * BPM -1.152 .250 -.092    
Social distance * Family income *
BPM -.081 .935 -.006    
Note. Social distance (0 = friends, 1 = strangers). Family Income = Average annual
per capita family income (1000 RMB). BPM = Both-parent migration.
* p < .05, **p < .01, all two-tailed.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080419.t003
Table 2. Spearman correlations of DG offers with child, family and SES variables.
 wDG fDG sDG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Social distance -.15** . .          
2 Children’s Age -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02         
3 Children’s Gender -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02        
4 Number of children 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.01       
5 Mo-migration -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0 0.02 -0.04 -0.09      
6 Fa-migration -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -.14** 0.02 0.01 -.26**     
7 Bo-migration 0.1 .20** 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -.18** -.40**    
8 Maternal education -0.07 -0.1 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -.31** 0.04 0.03 -0.08   
9 Paternal education -0.01 -0.1 0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 -.22** 0.06 -0.03 -0.09 .51**  
10 Family income -.10* -.19** -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -.31** 0 0.02 -0.02 .25** .18**
Note. wDG = Children’s DG offers in the whole sample (N = 455), fDG = DG offers to friends (N = 225), sDG = DG offers to strangers (N = 230). Social distance (0 = friends,
1 = strangers). Number of children= Number of children in the family. Family income = Average annual per capita family income. Mo-migration = Mother-only migration, Fa-
migration = Father-only migration, Bo-migration = Both-parent migration.
* p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all two-tailed.
a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080419.t002
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altruism to strangers was not influenced by SES [4], according
to the correlation analyses. However, young children’s DG
allocations to friends was related to SES in preschool age in
our sample. These findings thus suggest that the mechanisms
underlying human being’s prosocial behaviors to friends and to
strangers may differ since preschool age (or even earlier).
Children as young as four years old might have more chances
to observe adults’ interations with friends than to observe
people’s interactions with strangers, and they have more
chances to interact with friends than strangers in their daily life.
This possibility may partially explain why children’s altruistic
behaviors to strangers were not influenced by social context
examined in the present study, while their DG allocations to
friends varied with family income and their family migrant
status. However, it remains unclear whether such a difference
is inherent, or is caused by different early experiences, and
how young children’s altruisitic behaviors are shaped by these
two factors.
Another possible explanation for the discrepancy discussed
above may involve cultural differences. According to Engel’s
meta analysis and other cross-cultural studies [10], people from
diverse cultures behave differently in DG. Benenson [4]
examined the impact of SES differences in a western,
developed country, while we did so in the context of a
developing country that values collectivism. In western
developed countries, impoverished families might receive help
from social welfare/security. For instance, British children from
lower SES families were eligible to receive free lunches in
school, as reported in Benenson’s study [4]. However, in the
present study, about one third of all children are raised in
somewhat “absolutely impoverished” families. In a society that
values collectivism, especially when people are in poverty or
experiencing other adversities [22], they might have to rely on
each other in their local society (e.g., their family members,
relatives and friends) to get through hard days; thus reciprocal
altruism [23,24] could be a sensible explanation in this case.
Secondly, we found that young children’s prosocial behaviors
were influenced by social distance. Some reseachers argue
that human beings consider a small number of kin and friends
as comprising the “we group” ( i.e., a specific kind of “ingroup”)
and show an inherent preference for the members of that group
in decision making (e.g., [25–27]), a phenomenon referred to
as a kith-and-kin rationality. Previous study found that college
students were more altruistic to people who were closer to
them in terms of social distance[28]. The results of the present
Table 4. Regressions predicting DG offers.
Step Predictors t β R2 △R2 F change
Children’s DG offers      
1 Social distance -2.14* -.10 .01 .01 4.56*
2 Social distance -2.28* -.11    
Family Income -2.75** -.13 .03 .02 7.54**
Note. Social distance (0 = friends, 1 = strangers). Family Income = Average annual
per capita family income (1000 RMB).
* p < .05, **p < .01, all two-tailed.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0080419.t004
study demonstrate that kith-and-kin rationality may appear
early in preschool years, as they donated more stickers to
friends than to strangers. However, this result contradicted with
another study which found that 5-8-year-old East Asian
children in Canada seemed to show outgroup favoritism [29].
Here we should note that those children were Minority in
Canada, and being prosocial to out-groups might help them
adapt to local society. But children in the present study were
“mainstream” themselves, and being prosocial to their friends
might help them adapt to local community.
Although being left-behind is usually considered to be
disadvantageous for children in China [13] as well as in other
countries [30], it is demonstrated in the present study that
simply being left-behind did not affect young children’s
prosocial behaviors significantly. Children’s prosocial behaviors
may be influenced by their early experiences interacting with
their main care-givers (parents or grandparents, or other
extended family members who take care of them when parents
migrate)[31,32]. It may be a fruitful avenue for further
investigation of how altruistic values of children’s caregivers
and parental migrant status would influence older children’s
prosocial behaviors.
As noticed earlier, about 15-20% of the children in the
present study would give more than half stickers (i.e., hyper-fair
DG offers) to others in the dictator game. The hyper-fair
children also exist in other studies using the dictator game (see
[8]), however, the proportion of them seemed higher in the
present study than that reported in previous studies (see Figure
10 in [8]), which were primarily carried out in western countries.
A previous cross-cultural study showed that Chinese
preschoolers were more likely to share resources with peers
than Indian preschoolers, and the authors emphasized “the
importance of cultural beliefs on young children’s behavior” (p.
219) [33]. Indeed, Chinese children are often told by parents
and teachers to be modest, and to give valued resources to
others; this has been deemed as a virtue in Chinese culture.
For example, almost all children in China have heard the well
known story that Kong Rong, a four-year-old boy in ancient
China, gave the biggest pears to his brothers and only kept the
smallest one to himself. This story is told in almost all
kindergartens in China. The cultural influence may thus partly
explain why some children were hyper-fair in dictator games in
the present study.
The present results did not show any effect of sibling
interactions on prosocial behaviors to friends nor to strangers.
Children with and without siblings did not differ in their
prosocial behaviors to their friends or strangers. As about half
children in the present study were only children in their families
and the other half had siblings, we suggested that the absence
of siblings might not affect rural preschool children’s prosocial
behaviors to peers in China. This result is consistent with
previous studies showing that behavior problems [17] and
social values [34] in only children and children with siblings do
not differ significantly. Moreover, children who grow up in rural
communities probably spend a lot of time outdoors, thus social
interaction opportunities of only children and children with
siblings may not differ significantly. This may partly explain why
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they did not differ in terms of prosocial behaviors to friends and
to strangers.
As Engel pointed out in his meta analyses [8], researchers
have tested gender effects in DG, the results showing that
females give more and receive more resources in DG.
However, gender differences are not evident in children’s
prosocial behaviors in DG in the present study. This result was
not consistent with those evidenced in the Fehr et al. study [5],
which showed that boys demonstrated a stronger tendency of
egalitarianism than girls. On the other hand, the present results
contradict those in Andreoni & Vesterlund’s study [35] with
adults, which found that females tend to prefer equity more
than males. It is remains unclear whether the discrepancy
between the present findings and those of the previous study
(e.g., [35]) is due to cultural or developmental differences.
Possible adaptive significance of children’s altruistic
behaviors could be explained by social distance and family
characteristics. Children from lower income families tended to
be more altruistic than children from higher income families,
this might help them get more resources through reciprocity
[23,24] among people in their local community. Previous study
showed that children of preschool age could likely expect more
reciprocity from friends than from non-friends [36], and they
might rely on close friends or relatives more heavily than
strangers to conquer adversities that were accompanied with
poverty. Generally, this is more or less consistent with the
previous finding that adversities increase people’s prosocial
behaviors in Chinese adults [22]. The results of the present
study imply that children as young as four years old might have
adopted some of adults’ preferences to guide their altuistic
behaviors. This might help them to adapt to local society.
One limitation of the present study was that the effects of
family income and social distance were quite small, as shown
in the regression analysis. However, it should also be noted
that the participants in the present study were young preschool
children, and they had limited social experiences. This might be
a possible reason why family income and social distance only
had small effects. In a previous study, 4-9 years old urban
Chinese children were asked to donate stickers to either
friends or strangers in dictator games, the results showed that
in-group bias increased with children’s age[37]. Meanwhile, it is
worth noting that some other variables (such as gender and
parental migrant status) were not significant at all. This perhaps
makes the small effects even more salient. It would be quite
interesting if future studies could explore whether the effects of
social distance and family income would change as children’s
age increases in rural sample.
The evolution and mechanisms of altruism are hotly debated
by researchers from different areas [8,38–40]. The current
study suggests that culture and social context should be
considered when examining how SES influences children’s
altruistic behaviors. The present findings confirm that altruism
emerges early in human early childhood [3,4], and possibly
coevolved with culture groups [41]. However, the ecological,
biological and cognitive mechanism of children’s altruistic
behaviors remain largely unknown, as researchers point out,
“altruism researchers must cooperate” (p. 653) in the future
[40].
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